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Abstract: In recent years, several dynamic identity-based two-factor user authentication using password and smartcard have been
proposed to provide mutual authentication between the user and server over unreliable networks. However, the design of secure
cryptographic schemes is still notoriously hard, and there have been several instances of detected flaws in published schemes. For
example in 2010, Hao and Yu demonstrated that Wang et al.’s user authentication scheme is insecure against off-line password guessing
and server masquerade attacks, and proposed an improved scheme. Subsequently in 2012, Chao pointed out that the improved scheme
of Hao and Yu is, unfortunately, susceptible to off-line password guessing and server masquerade attacks, and prone to password
backward security problem; and proposed an enhanced scheme. In this paper, we demonstrated that Chao’s enhanced scheme is not
secure against user masquerade attack, server masquerade attack, insider attack and off-line password guessing attack in violation of its
security claim as well as it fails to achieve users’ anonymity.
Keywords: Two-factor authentication, One-way hash function, Password guessing attack, Insider attack, Password, Smartcard

1 Introduction
As the Internet evolves from an academic and research
network into a commercial network, more and more
organizations and individuals are connecting their internal
networks and computers to the Internet. Investment in
network expansion by telecommunications companies
will see a further expansion in capacity that will result in
an increase in bandwidth availability and greater adoption
of wireless and mobile technologies. As businesses
continue to engage in electronic commerce, they will
become increasingly globalised and interconnected.
These, and other developments, create not only benefits
for the community, but also risks of cybercrime [1].
Cybercriminals, for example, aim to disrupt one or more
combinations of the following security notions: data
confidentiality, data integrity and data availability. The
ability to provide security guarantees is of paramount
importance and several initiatives have been proposed to
address this concern. Due to the low computation cost and
portability of smartcard and easy memorization of user
chosen
password,
two-factor
smartcard
∗ Corresponding

authentication [2–21] using password is commonly used
in Internet-based applications such as remote user/server
login, online banking, Pay-TV, electronic voting, secret
online order placement.
In recent years, several smartcard based password
authentication schemes have been published. For example
in 2002, Chien et al. [2] proposed one such scheme, but
was subsequently found to be vulnerable to reflection and
insider attacks [3]. To remove these drawbacks, Ku and
Chen [3] designed another improved scheme, but Wang et
al. [4] demonstrated that the scheme is insecure against
off-line password guessing attack, forgery attack and
denial of service (DoS) attack, and proposed another
improved scheme. However, Chung et al. [5] revealed that
Wang et al.’s scheme [2] is still susceptible to
impersonation attack and off-line password guessing
attack. In addition, Wang et al.’s scheme is not easily
repairable and is unable to provide perfect forward
secrecy of the generated session key. Other instances of
vulnerabilities in published smartcard-based password
authentication schemes include off-line password
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guessing attack [6–8, 22], impersonation attack [9–11],
forgery attack [4, 12–14], DoS attack [4, 7, 18, 23], parallel
session attack [4, 9, 10, 18], replay attack [23], stolen/lost
smartcard attack [9, 22, 24], observing power
and
reverse
engineering
consumption
[25]
techniques [26, 27].
In this paper, we examine the protocol of Chao [16]
whose history is as follows. In 2010, Hao and Yu [17]
pointed out that Wang et al.’s scheme [6] is not secure
against off-line password guessing attack and server
masquerade attack, and proposed an enhanced scheme.
Unfortunately, Chao [16] demonstrated that Hao and Yu’s
scheme [17] is still insecure against off-line password
guessing attack and server masquerade attack, and prone
to password backward security problem i.e., the scheme
must be replaced if the scheme was attacked for one time,
in violation of its security claims.
They then designed an improved ID-based scheme.
The latter scheme is examined in this paper where we
pointed out that this scheme is not secure from insider
attack, server masquerade attack and user masquerade
attack and user’s anonymity problem. Furthermore, the
scheme is susceptible to off-line password guessing
attacks in which an attacker exhaustively enumerates all
possible passwords in an offline manner to find out the
correct password on lost/stolen smartcard. Off-line
password guessing attacks have been used by both
criminals and law enforcement and digital forensics
practitioners to enable access to password-protected data
(e.g. on smart phones and portable devices based on RIM
Black Berry and Apple iOS platforms).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section
2 briefly describes the Chao’s smartcard-based user
authentication scheme [16], and Section 3 outlines our
attacks. The last section concludes the paper.

2.1 Registration phase

2 Review of Chao’s smartcard-based user
authentication scheme

Step 1. S checks whether Ti − Ti ≤ ∆ Ti holds, if not, S
rejects Ui ’s login request. Otherwise, S proceeds
to the next step.
′
Step 2. S computes Ni = h(x k ri ), IDi = Mi ⊕ Ni ⊕ Ti and
′
′
′
CIDi = h(IDi k Ti ). S checks whether CIDi = CIDi
holds and terminates the login request if they are
′
not equal. Otherwise, S computes a = h(TS k IDi k
Ni ) and sends the message (a, Ts ) to Ui , where TS
is the current timestamp of S.
′
Step 3. Suppose that Ui receives (a, TS ) at time TS . Now
′
′
Ui computes a = h(TS k IDi k h(x k ri ) ) and
authenticates
S if ′ both of the conditions
′
TS − TS ≤ ∆ TS and a = a hold. Ui terminates the
login request if either of the above fails.

The Chao’s scheme consists of four phases: registration
phase, login phase, verification phase and password
change phase, and the notations used are listed in Table 1.

Table 1: Notations used in Chao’s authentication scheme
Notations Descriptions
Ui
A legitimate user
IDi
Identity of the user Ui
PWi
Password of the user Ui
Remote server
S
x
Long-term secret of the remote server S
h(·)
Secure one-way hash function (i.e., SHA-1)
Concatenation operation
k
⊕
Bit-wise XOR operation
Current timestamp of the entity i
Ti
∆ Ti
Acceptable time interval

This phase is executed between user Ui and the remote
server S, and consists of the following steps:
Step 1. Ui chooses an identity-password pair (IDi , PWi )
and then sends it to S through a secure channel.
Step 2. On receiving (IDi , PWi ), S checks the identity IDi
of Ui , selects a random number ri and computes
Ki = h(x k ri ) ⊕ h(PWi ) and Li = h(IDi k h(x k ri )).
Step 3. S issues a smartcard and writes the parameters
(Ki , Li , h(·)) into it. Then S sent the smartcard to
Ui through a secure channel.

2.2 Login phase
In order to login to the remote server S, Ui inserts his
smartcard into a card reader and inputs IDi and PWi , then
the smartcard performs the followings:
′

Step 1. The smartcard computes h(x k ri ) = Ki ⊕ h(PWi )
′
′
′
and Li = h(IDi k h(x k ri ) ), and compares Li with
Li and continues to the next step if they are equal,
otherwise rejects the login request.
Step 2. The
smartcard
then
computes
′
Mi = IDi ⊕ h(x k ri ) ⊕ Ti and CIDi = h(IDi k Ti ),
and sends the login message (CIDi , Mi , Ti ) to S
through an open channel, where Ti is the current
timestamp of Ui .

2.3 Verification phase
Assume that S received the message (CIDi , Mi , Ti ) at time
′
Ti and then S does the followings:
′

2.4 Password change phase
This phase allows Ui to change his old password PWi to a
new password PWi∗ with the following operations:
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Step 1. Ui inserts his smartcard into the card reader and
inputs IDi and PWi , then the smartcard computes
′
h(x k ri )
= Ki ⊕ h(PWi )
and
′
′
′
Li = h(IDi k h(x k ri ) ), and compares Li with Li
for valid password change operation. If they are
not equal, the smartcard rejects the password
change request and asks Ui for exact PWi and IDi .
Otherwise, the smartcard proceeds to the next
step.
Step 2. Smartcard computes Ki∗ = h(PWi∗ ) ⊕ h(PWi ) ⊕ Ki
and replaces Ki with Ki∗ . The secure password
change phase is finished.

3 Cryptanalysis of Chao’s smartcard-based
user authentication scheme
This section demonstrated that Chao’s authentication
scheme [16] is vulnerable to insider attack, user
masquerade attack, server masquerade attack and off-line
password guessing attack, as well as it fails to achieve
users’ anonymity. Before introducing the proposed
attacks, we describe the following widely used
assumptions about the power of an adversary
A [10, 11, 15, 18, 22, 28, 29].
(A1) A can sniff the communication media through
which Ui and S communicate with each other i.e., A can
intercept, block, inject, remove, or modify, any messages
transmitted in the media.
(A2) A may either (a) steal user’s smartcard and extract
the stored secrets by monitoring the timing information,
power consumption and reverse engineering techniques as
mentioned in [25–27] and guess the user’s password in
off-line manner using the secrets extracted from the
smartcard; or (b) obtain a user’s password directly by
some means. However, the adversary is not allowed to do
both (a) and (b) as having the smartcard and knowing the
password would be trivial to impersonate the legitimate
user.
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(d) A repeats the steps (b) and (c) until it finds the exact
identity IDi of Ui .
The adversary A can easily guess the identity IDi of Ui
by checking all possible identities from the search space
|DID |, where | · | indicates the cardinality of DID . The
running time of the aforementioned procedure is
O(|DID |) × (Tc + Th ), where Tc and Th represents the
execution time of concatenation and hash operations,
respectively. It can be noted that for easy memorization,
user generally chooses his identity with low intensity
value from the set DID having small number of elements.
Since DID is not large enough in practice, for example,
|DID | ≤ 10−6 [30–33] and the time complexities Tc and Th
are also negligible, thus A can complete the above
procedure in polynomial time.

3.2 User masquerade attack
We now demonstrate that Chao’s scheme [16] is not secure
against user masquerade attack.
(a) A monitor the communication channel and intercepts
a login message (CIDi , Mi , Ti ) in a session.
(b) A finds the exact identity IDi of Ui by executing steps
discussed in section 3.1.
(c) A selects a valid timestamp Ti∗ (>Ti ), computes Mi∗ =
Mi ⊕ Ti ⊕ Ti∗ = IDi ⊕ h(x k ri ) ⊕ Ti∗ , CID∗i ′ = h(IDi k
Ti∗ ) and then sends the forged message (CID∗i , Mi∗ , Ti∗ )
to S for login operation.
(d) On receiving (CID∗i , Mi∗ , Ti∗ ), S will confirm that the
timestamp validity condition Ti∗ ′ − Ti∗ ≤ ∆ Ti∗ is
correct,
and
computes
Ni∗ = h(x k ri ),
IDi = Mi∗ ⊕ Ni ⊕ Ti∗ , CID∗i = h(IDi k Ti∗ ) after
confirming that CID∗i ′ = CID∗i . With these successful
verifications, S accepts the forged login request and
allows A to login to S. Thus, A impersonates the
valid user Ui .

3.3 Server masquerade attack
3.1 Users’ anonymity problem
In recent years, many dynamic identity-based remote login
schemes [6, 16–21] have been proposed to provide mutual
authentication between the user and the remote server. In
any dynamic identity-based remote login scheme, users’
anonymity [6, 7, 22] is an important security requirement.
Now, we show that Chao’s scheme [16] fails to achieve the
same as follows:
(a) A intercepts a login message (CIDi , Mi , Ti ) of Ui of
′
a previous session, where Mi = IDi ⊕ h(x k ri ) ⊕ Ti ,
CIDi = h(IDi k Ti ) and Ti is the current timestamp.
(b) A guesses an identity ID∗i and computes
CID∗i = h(ID∗i k Ti ).
(c) A verifies the correctness of ID∗i by checking whether
the computed CID∗i and the intercepted CIDi are equal.

This section demonstrated that Chao’s user scheme [16] is
vulnerable to server masquerade attack.
(a) A intercepts Ui ’s login message (CIDi , Mi , Ti ) of
previous session.
(b) A finds the exact identity IDi of Ui by executing steps
discussed in section 3.1.
(c) A computes h(x k ri ) = Mi ⊕ IDi ⊕ Ti , selects a
timestamp TS∗ (>TS ), computes a fabricated message
(a∗ , TS∗ )
and
sends
it
to
Ui ,
where
a∗ = h(TS∗ k IDi k h(x k ri )).
(d) Upon receiving the message (a∗ , TS∗ ), Ui found that
both the conditions TS∗ ′ − TS∗ ≤ ∆ TS∗ and a∗′ = a∗ are
satisfied, where a∗′ = h(TS∗ k IDi k h(x k ri )) is
computed by Ui . Therefore, A get able to trick the
legitimate user Ui to believe that A is legal server S
not an adversary.
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3.4 Off-line password guessing attack
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Assume that if the smartcard of Ui is lost/stolen and it is
in the physical possession of A , who then extracts the
original contents (Ki , Li , h(·)) by monitoring their timing
information [25], power consumption and reverse
engineering
techniques
[26,
27],
where
Ki = h(x k ri ) ⊕ h(PWi ) and Li = h(IDi k h(x k ri )). Also
we suppose that A monitors the communication channel
and recovers Ui ’s valid login message (CIDi , Mi , Ti ) of a
session, where Mi = IDi ⊕ h(x k ri ) ⊕ Ti ,
CIDi = h(IDi k Ti ) and Ti is the timestamp. In order to
launch an off-line password guessing attack on the stolen
smartcard, A executes the following operations:
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(a) A finds the exact identity IDi of Ui and h(x k ri ) from
the intercepted message (CIDi , Mi , Ti ) by executing the
steps discussed in section 3.3.
(b) A computes Xi = Ki ⊕ h(x k ri ) = h(PWi ).
(c) A guesses a PWi∗ and computes Xi∗ = h(PWi∗ ).
(d) A verifies the correctness of guessed PWi∗ by
checking whether Xi∗ and Xi are equal.
(e) A repeats the steps (c) and (d) until to have the exact
password PWi of Ui .
The running time of the above password guessing attack
is O(|DID |) × (Tc + Th ) + O(|DPW |) × (Tc + Th + Tx ),
where Tx represents the execution time of bit-wise XOR
operation. As discussed earlier in section 3.1, the search
spaces DID and DPW are unlikely to be large enough (for
example, |DID | ≤ 10−6 and |DPW | ≤ 10−6 [30–33]), and
the time complexities Tc , Th and Tx all can be executed
with negligible amount of time, thus the polynomial
time-bounded adversary A can find the exact password
PWi of Ui easily.

3.5 Insider attack
Studies have demonstrated that users tend to use the same
password for different applications [4, 19]. If the
adversary, A , is a malicious insider of the remote server
S and has learned Ui ’s password (a trivial exercise as Ui
sends his (IDi , PWi ) in plaintext form to S during the
registration phase of Chao’s scheme [16]), A may try to
masquerade the user Ui using the password PWi to access
other servers.

4 Conclusion
We examined the identity-based smartcard-based remote
password authentication scheme of Chao (2012), and
demonstrated that the scheme is susceptible to common
attacks, namely user masquerade attack, server
masquerade attack, insider attack and off-line password
guessing attack.
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